Nearly every year Congress fails to pass all of the appropriations acts before the start of the federal fiscal year. This necessitates the passage of a temporary spending measure -a continuing resolution -or there will be at least a partial government shutdown. Both contingencies are costly and disruptive to the efficient and effective operation of government. Over the last 30 years, there have been several legislative proposals to enact an automatic continuing resolution mechanism that would mitigate the costs to public management. Such proposals, however, are costly for political and legal reasons. This article examines the arguments for and against automatic continuing resolutions from these various perspectives.
Introduction
James Madison suggested that the interdependencies between branches of government would serve to check and balance power, and that the structure of such relations is an auxiliary control to democratic accountability. 1 He may not have expected the routine administrative functions of government to demand such control, but apparently some do. This essay examines a statutory proposal to mitigate the costs of a dysfunctional routine federal process and concludes that Madison is right: Shortcutting the interdependencies by removing "their mutual relations" 2 would be more costly than accepting the inefficiency.
Background
The Constitution of the United States conditions that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." 3 This is a positive rule: the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress. 4 Being a positive rule, in those instances when an appropriation is not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, there may be a lapse in funding.
The Constitutional prohibition is enforced through portions of Title 31 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, derived from and still commonly referred to as the Antideficiency Act. 5 The statute prohibits an officer or employee of the federal government from making or authorizing an expenditure of funds in the absence of, or in excess of, an appropriation. Without an appropriation, a shutdown of the affected functions of government ensues with exceptions for emergencies. Such shutdowns have occurred on 17 occasions in the last 35 years, 6 the most recent -and perhaps most impactful -occurred in fiscal year 1996. The fact that a shutdown has not occurred in over a decade does not mean that Congresses have completed all the appropriation bills on time.
To the contrary, Congress normally passes several temporary spending measures each year in order to avoid a government shutdown. It is so typical, that in only three of the last 60 years has Congress avoided the need to pass a temporary spending measure to avert a shutdown. 7 Failing to appropriate funds for the operation of the entire federal government before the fiscal year begins is the norm.
Definition and Operation of CRs
Temporary spending measures are called continuing appropriation acts or more commonly, continuing resolutions (CR). The Congressional Research Service reports that in the past 14 years, Congress has passed 87 CRs. 8 In that period, on average, the last appropriation was completed 130 days after the start of the fiscal year. 9 In extreme cases -which happened twice in the last six years -the majority of the federal government was funded under "temporary" measures for the entire fiscal year.
10 For fiscal year 2011, only the National Defense Appropriations Act was enacted (196 days late) and the remaining functions of government were funded for the entire year under a series of eight CRs.
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A CR differs from a regular appropriations act in two important ways. First, a regular appropriations act is generally written in consonance with (or actually serves as) the authorizing legislation for those government functions. Most government functions change at least a little from year to year: programs are added, revised or terminated; eligibility rules differ, the scope and duration of activities are altered, capital investments or divestments are approved and funded, or programs migrate from one agency to another. In the absence of the new appropriations act, the authorized program is "frozen" in the prior year configuration. 12 A new fighter jet may not transition from R&D to production, new clientele may not be served, an ineffectual program may not be terminated, nor may a pay raise be given to employees.
The second difference concerns the amount of funding available and the time period during which it is available. A regular appropriations act contains sufficient funding for the entire fiscal year, barring some contingency. A CR is usually limited in amount to a formula that is tied to either the prior year level of funding, the President's proposed budget, the Congressional Budget Resolution, or the lower of those three. The CR is also designed to be temporary. Of the 87 CRs between 19998 and 2011, the average duration was 30 days, and 42 of them were for one week or less. 13 The operation of the executive branch during a period of CR is tightly managed by the Office of Management and Budget and agency chief financial officers. Given the frequency with which CRs occur, administrative guidance has been refined over the years. Modern guidance traces its origin to opinions of the Attorney General during the Carter Administration 14 and is currently incorporated in circulars distributed by the Office of Management and Budget. 15 The cost of CRs.
Failing to appropriate funding for the federal government is problematic when viewed from any of several perspectives. 16 From a legal perspective, it means agencies are operating under tentative authorities. The law should bring order to government operations and provide the executive the clear intent of the legislature; a CR fails to do that. CRs typically have eleven technical provisions describing the formula (rate of spending), apportionment rules, prohibitions against new starts, and other boilerplate limitations. 17 As noted above, OMB and most agencies have administrative regulations for complying with these standard provisions, but Congress may also add specific provisions (anomalies) to CRs 18 that must be interpreted by the executive and against which administrative regulations must be compared. Because of CRs, instead of having a single appropriation with which to comply for the fiscal year, there are several, and time is unproductively spent interpreting the tentative intent of Congress just to keep basic operations functioning.
From a public management perspective, CRs are costly. There is inefficiency: slowing the development of new programs, hiring delays, and repetition of administrative tasks such as apportioning funding to subordinate organizations and placing small amounts of money on contracts for routine services. There is a cost to clientele as services are interrupted or fail to grow with inflation and adapt to demographic shifts. The uncertainty disrupts the implementation of strategic plans and programmatic activity. 19 Both the number of CRs and their duration impede agency productivity.
From a political science perspective, CRs are symptomatic of political discord or a contested political agenda. 20 When the chambers of the legislature, political parties, or the legislature and executive cannot reconcile their positions concerning spending, the appropriations bills are usually late. Where concordance exists the bills are completed on time (as was the case for many of the national defense appropriations in the years immediately after the terrorist attacks in 2001), but where there is discord bills are late. In other cases, more urgent matters or elections distract the political agenda from routine business. It is not uncommon for appropriations to be incomplete going into the fall campaign season and CRs are written to fund agencies into January to allow the newly elected congress to finish the bills. Rarely are appropriations left to lame duck sessions of Congress.
CRs also have the potential to stymie the inherent oversight of executive agencies through the annual appropriations process. It is through the routine scrutiny of agency missions, projects, scope and size during budget deliberations that an important democratic oversight function occurs. It has been argued that serial CRs impact congressional deliberation and "do not reflect considered legislative judgment." 21 Continuing Resolutions are costly: they represent a problem for managers, a contingency for government employees and program clientele, and a symptom of political discordance. Over the years, legislators have proposed a mechanism to mitigate those costs.
A Solution in Automatic Continuing Resolutions?
Congress began considering the idea of an automatic continuing resolution (ACR) in the 1980s and over the last 20 years ACR proposals have been acted on by seven Congresses. 22 Members of both the House and Senate of the current Congress have introduced bills with ACR provisions. 23 An ACR generally works as follows: Title 31 of the U.S. Code would be amended to put a permanent mechanism in place to automatically create an appropriation to continue programs, projects and activities from the prior fiscal year, at approximately the same rate of spending as the prior year. The level of funding may be linked to the previous year or the president's budget request; in some designs, the level of funding declines over time. 24 The primary goal of an ACR is to avoid a government shutdown; the secondary goals are to avoid the management and political churn associated with serial CRs.
None of these legislative proposals has been enacted and the current proposals seem likely to die in committee. The only one to pass both chambers and be presented to the President occurred in 1997 25 and President Clinton vetoed it for reasons to be discussed shortly.
Arguments for ACRs
A shutdown erodes public confidence in government and an ACR would avoid that. 26 Managerially, the notion of an ACR is logical and beneficial. A shutdown exacerbates the costs of a CR by actually denying services to beneficiaries and the general public, by affecting private sector companies that do business with the government, by furloughing government employees, and by reducing the efficiency of the provision of services. 27 Second, knowing in advance the terms of an ACR and that its duration is unbounded gives the program manager freedom to plan and operate that does not occur under a series of short-term CRs.
Politically, an ACR removes from the legislature the task of drafting and passing tentative spending measures, alleviating the crisis mode of operations, permitting them to focus on negotiating the regular appropriation. 28 It also removes the temptation to use CRs as a vehicle for legislative "riders" -provisions of law unrelated to the appropriation that are amended to the bill because the bill is perceived as one that must pass.
Legally, administrative regulations for the ACR could be crafted to conform to the terms of the funding in advance of the mechanism triggering, providing the executive greater certainty, eliminating the need to individually reconcile each CR with administrative regulations, speeding apportionment, and minimizing the risk of noncompliance.
Arguments against ACRs
Opponents of ACRs base most of their arguments on adverse policy effects that would likely result from ill-advised incentives created in political processes. One argument is that the presence of an ACR would engender a status quo bias. 29 Those who favor either an increase or decrease in funding for a given program could see the appropriations process hindered. Rather than engage in negotiation or compromise on a new spending level, the opponent of the change simply needs to obstruct the change effort and let the automatic spending take over.
Some fear that the presence of the ACR removes the urgency -and even the will -to finish the regular appropriations bill. The political cost of gridlock in the absence of an ACR is a government shutdown which is significantly higher than the cost of accepting the status quo under an ACR. And the status quo may exact a smaller political cost than negotiating a change to a program. To some legislators, the politically prudent act would be to do nothing.
Individual spending decisions are a touchstone of the annual budget and appropriations process. Each year, the size, scope and reach of thousands of functions of government and individual investment decisions are deliberated. With an ACR and its status quo bias, the annual ritual could devolve into a process of exception instead of a process of deliberation. Over time, all of the discretionary spending accounts could be perceived as mandatory spending and a deliberate action to effect a change becomes politically risky, much like today with proposed changes to "third rail" programs like Social Security.
In turn, if there is no engagement over funding decisions, there are fewer opportunities for legislative oversight. The incentives for inaction can be viewed as an abdication of congressional responsibility and a diminution of electoral accountability. 30 The reasons given by President Clinton for vetoing the ACR provision in 1997 was that it "would provide resources … below the level contained in the Bipartisan Budget Agreement" and that the negotiated agreement was "consistent with our values and principles. Putting the Government's finances on automatic pilot is not." 31 Legally, there are concerns about the link between ACRs and CBO's rules for scorekeeping. Deficit control measures such as the PAYGO budget enforcement mechanism 32 would be confounded by automatic spending measures. And for the Defense Department, the Constitution explicitly prohibits appropriations "for a longer Term than two Years" 33 and a funding mechanism of indefinite duration could run afoul of that constitutional provision.
Conclusion
With only three years in 60 without a CR, some would argue the appropriations process is a 95 percent failure. But, clearly, the functions of government have not been irreparably harmed. Government may be less efficient, but the Founding Fathers did not envision an efficient government. To the contrary, they intentionally designed an inefficient one. One in which the branches are expected to be interdependent.
The costs of that failure manifest in management and social impacts from reduced efficiency and effectiveness of government programs. These can be considered economic transaction costs of our form of government. While the mechanism of an ACR could mitigate those costs, it comes at an unacceptably high price to our political system and fundamental values as a nation. Perhaps it is a blessing none have been enacted. Until a better proposal comes along (or the basic structures and incentives of governing change) it appears we have to accept an ironic state of affairs: failure is preferable. "An outcome for which no feasible superior alternative can be described and implemented with net gains is presumed to be efficient." 
